美國軍事專家Robbin Laird與Edward Timperlake籲川普將台灣納入太平洋防衛網絡+作者原文 ◎VOA+Breaking Defense 2016-12-30

敬請支持‧歡迎訂閱本報newsletter

飛行中途在太平洋上空加油(美國空軍提供)

飛行中途在太平洋上空加油(美國空軍提供)

自台灣總統蔡英文與美國當選總統川普通電話之後,中國在台灣附近海域、空域的軍事活動也明顯增加,台灣開始面對一個更具侵略性的軍事環境。美國軍事專家呼籲即將上台的川普政府,將台灣納入太平洋防禦網絡(Pacific Defense Grid)內,因為中國正在進入太平洋展現它的力量及影響力,直接威脅到美國和盟友的利益。

美國軍事專家羅賓‧萊爾德(Robbin Laird)與愛德華‧丁伯雷克(Edward Timperlake)星期四在美國軍事新聞網《Breaking Defense》撰文說,中國正在運用其不斷擴大的軍事能力,試圖將武力投射到日本附近島嶼和出入澳大利亞的海上要道,它的軍事與外交戰略目標已經超越台灣。

萊爾德、丁伯雷克及理查德‧懷茲(Richard Weitz)是《重建美國在太平洋軍事力量:一個21世紀戰略》一書的共同作者。萊爾德與丁伯雷克在這篇「台灣,川普與太平洋防禦網絡:朝向威懾縱深」的文章裡指出,冷戰已結束,美國沒有理由停留在基辛格與尼克松聯中制俄的時光隧道里,雖然川普與蔡英文的通話引起外交圈震撼,不過「現在正是時候翻開新頁,把台灣包含在21世紀太平洋防禦的威懾戰略裡」。

歡迎訂閱本報newsletter

2位專家說, 美國海軍領導層正在推動建立「整合式攻擊網」(integrated kill webs)的概念,它將散佈範圍廣闊的資源,包括船艦、飛機、潛艇整合,並將它們運用在延伸的戰場,通過「感應與發射」的重新組合,讓各種防衛與攻擊平台不至獨立作戰,而台灣可以被無縫整合到這個威懾戰略裡,只要川普表達有這種政治意願。

萊爾德與丁伯雷克說,台灣可以成為美國與盟友安全防衛活動的固定參與者,並輕易融入一個防衛與威懾的系統裡,例如讓台灣參與各種涉及區域盟友海警單位的安全活動。

2位作者在文章裡強調,如果在向太平洋推動軍事力量之際台灣持續被孤立,沒有被拉進美國-日本-澳大利亞的深度威懾網絡內,那麼「這個孤單的島嶼將成為一個可以讓北京從樹上摘取的蘋果」,因此川普與蔡英文的通話,為威懾中國開啟新篇章「設置了一個強而有力的標記」。

文章說,強化台灣安全防衛是台灣的正當權利,也是《台灣關係法》允許的作為,台灣正處於一個有效抗衡中國深入太平洋的軍事戰略關口,一個新的台灣政策正代表了一個防衛太平洋島嶼的新做法,中國已經改變了遊戲的性質,台灣、美國、日本或澳大利亞,都不能接受中國侵犯西太平洋及南中國海的海洋自由。

過去幾個星期不但有各種中國空軍戰機在台灣南北空域繞行,這個星期解放軍航母遼寧號也穿過台灣海峽航行到海南島。台灣軍方說,這些軍事活動今後將更為頻繁而且會常態化,中國軍方則說,這是中國早已規劃好的例行遠海演訓。

原文網址︰http://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/taiwan-trump-a-pacific-defense-grid-towards-deterrence-in-depth/

CSBA graphic

Taiwan lies deep inside the kill zone of Chinese land-based missiles, let alone air and naval forces, as shown in this CSBA graphic.

The phone call between President-elect Trump and the President of Taiwan sent shock waves through the diplomatic community. But it is time to turn the page and include Taiwan in shaping a 21st century deterrence strategy for Pacific defense.

The People’s Republic of China has made it clear that the regime is moving out into the Pacific, asserting its power and influence, and directly threatening U.S. interests and U.S. allies.  It is reaching beyond Taiwan in its military and diplomatic strategy, using its expanded capabilities for power projection into the Pacific to reach out to the Japanese island chains as well as the key maritime access points to Australia.

It is clear how important control of Taiwan would be it shaping a pincer strategy against Japan, Australia, and American military installations in the Pacific. Why would the United States then simply stand by and ignore the defense of Taiwan and its key place in a strategic reshaping of Pacific strategy? That would be turning the Pacific Pivot into the Pacific Divot.

Richard Nixon

Richard Nixon

There is little reason to be frozen in time with Kissinger and Nixon who sought to counterbalance the Soviet Union by embracing Communist China. Last time we looked, the Soviet Union had collapsed. Russia is not the Soviet Union: Today’s Kremlin sees no commonality of relationships with China, except and only with regard to realpolitik. As such, there is little to be gained by appeasing the PRC in hopes of containing Russia. Deterring Russia is a task all unto itself, as it forges a 21st century approach to power, using its military capabilities to shape outcomes seen as essential to Russian national interest by Putin.  And today China is a power unto it itself, one that has departed dramatically from its place in the global system when Nixon and Kissinger negotiated the Shanghai Communiqué.

As Danny Lam, a Canadian analyst, has underscored: “Normalization of relations with the PRC was accomplished through the issuance of three communiqués in 1972, 1979, and 1982 that defined the relationship.  In those documents, the PRC and US explicitly acknowledged their differences….and made clear that the differences are only papered over temporarily for the sake of peace. Temporarily is the operative word.”

This was converted to the “one China policy” at the end of the Carter Administration, where Carter severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China.. But Carter’s policy was also forged during the Cold War with what is now the non-existent Soviet Union and before China turned into a military power seeking to assert that power deep into the region. It is time to exit the Madame Tussaud museum of policy initiatives and shape a Taiwan policy for the 21st century, which is part of a broader deterrent strategy.

Navy photo

The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers STENNIS (foreground) and REAGAN (background) operate together in the Pacific.

Deterrence In Depth

Both the technology available to the United States and the policy shifts of core allies in the Pacific enable a new strategy of deterrence in depth. Japan has focused on its extended defense; Australia upon the integration of its forces with a capability for the extended defense of Australia; U.S. forces on shaping a force to operate over the extended ranges of the Pacific. Now is the time for a serious rebooting of the role of Taiwan in extended Pacific defense and security.

Marine Corps photo

Lt. Gen. Terry Robling (left) samples purified water in a disaster relief exercise in Brunei.

As then-commander of Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, put it: “I like the term deterrence in depth because that’s exactly what it is. It’s not always about defense in depth. It’s about deterring and influencing others’ behavior, so they can contribute to the region’s stability, both economically and militarily, in an environment where everyone conforms to the rule of law and international norms.”

How to implement this approach militarily? U.S. Navy leadership has pioneered the concept of building integrated kill webs, which network together widely dispersed assets — ships, planes, submarines — across the extended battlespace,  allowing new combinations of sensors and shooters in which “no platform fights alone.” Taiwan can be seamlessly integrated into such a deterrence strategy with the political will expressed by President-Elect Donald Trump.

In our discussions with the new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Mike Manazir, he highlighted the key role of integrated forces across a distributed operational area. It is clear that both the Air Force, the Navy and Marine Corps team are focused on shaping the force for the high-end fight against peer competitors.

The Army’s main contribution in such considerations is the expanding and evolving role of Army air and missile defense systems. But in so doing, the focus is upon building a modular, agile force, which can operate across the spectrum of military operations, not only in the high-end fight. It is about shaping platforms into an integrated force, which can deliver lethal and non-lethal effects throughout the battlespace.

Taiwan can enter easily into a system of distributed defense and deterrence in depth. One can start by involving them in various security efforts associated with allied coast guard forces in the region. The Taiwanese can become a regular participant as a presence force associated with allied and U.S. security operations.

Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy can engage in partnership in the evolving distributed approach to an integrated Pacific defense strategy. Against a PRC pushing out its military capability into the Pacific, if Taiwan is isolated unto itself and not part of a US-Japanese-Australian deterrence in depth force, the lonely island will become an apple for Beijing to pluck from the tree. President Elect Donald Trump’s phone call put a very powerful marker down for a new chapter in deterring the PRC.

As we wrote in our book on Pacific strategy published three years ago, Beijing sees Taiwan from the perspective of holding their control over the centrifugal forces in their empire:

The conflict with Taiwan is subsumed in Chinese thinking as part of the core territorial-integrity challenges.

The Island of Formosa was part of China since its conquest in the Qing Dynasty in the 17th century. It was ceded to Japan in 1895 and returned to China after the war.

In the ensuing Chinese civil war, the forces of Chiang Kai-shek were pushed off the Chinese mainland and relocated to Formosa. Here the Republic of China was established.

Over time, the Republic of China has evolved into a vibrant democracy, and it is the quality of Taiwan as a modern democracy that is a major challenge to the authoritarian Chinese leadership on the mainland.[1]

US military bases on Guam are literally the center of the new Pacific strategy. (Map courtesy Robbin Laird).

US military bases on Guam are literally the center of the new Pacific strategy. (Map courtesy Robbin Laird).

 

Taiwan As Cornerstone

A new Taiwan policy and indeed a new approach to Pacific islands is a key part of any new “constrainment strategy” towards China. Taiwan lies at the juncture of any effective Pacific military strategy against the PRC coming out deeper into the Pacific. The PRC has changed the nature of the game. Neither Taiwan, the United States, Japan, nor Australia should accept Chinese encroachment on freedom of the sea in the Western Pacific and South China Sea.

A PRC-dominated Taiwan would be militarily poised to disrupt US and allied operations and significantly disrupt the ability to operate in a “strategic quadrangle.” If the PLA (generic for all PRC military forces) is given time to dig in and build a robust redundant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) network from survivable, hardened ground facilities with dug-in and hardened missile batteries, it would be a significant new combat challenge. The combination of survivable ISR 100-plus miles off the Chinese coast, linked with sea-based platforms, PLAAF attack planes, and their satellites (if they are allowed to survive) could be very deadly at sea for the US Navy and allied forces.

Enhancing the defense of Taiwan is a legitimate right of Taiwan and is permitted by the Taiwan Relations Act: “In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

But self-defense of Taiwan against a PRC reaching deep into the Pacific cannot be done without collaboration with the US, Japan and Australia in a broader strategic effort. We can look for ways to both enhance Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and contribute to Pacific defense. One key way would for Taiwan to extend the reach of their Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) into the area and enhanced their Command & Control (C2).

Missile Defense Agency photo

THAAD missile launch.

These capabilities could evolve further as the US Army builds out its Air Defense Artillery (ADA) capability in the region. A new way to think about the ADA approach is to build the support facilities throughout the Pacific whereby THAAD missile defense systems and other air defense can be supported.

How can we deploy THAAD batteries to remote islands, as part of a flexible network of defensive systems? The Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of a truck-mounted THAAD missile launcher alone is 66,000 lbs, while the heavy lift CH-53 helicopter can take only 30,000 lbs internally or sling-load 36,000 externally (range unrefueled is 621 nautical miles). However, the actual missile battery — separated from the vehicle carrying it — is 26,000 lbs and well inside the lift capacity of a CH-53.

The problem is the mechanisms to raise and lower the launcher and rearm. A launcher (sans truck) might be lowered from the air onto reinforced concrete pads with calibrated launch points. Or, a separate modular lift device could be put in place to load and reload. Consequently, taking apart modules doesn’t appear to be a showstopper. As for deploying the crews, Marine MV-22 Opsreys flying in Army ADA troops into any reasonable terrain is absolutely no problem. (The weight of the THAAD command post and radar may be of concern, however).

Marine Corps photo

CH-53K

To date, the Big Army has not spent much time thinking about using MV-22s and CH-53Ks, which are exclusively Marine Corps systems. But there is precedent for such operations:In the Vietnam War, the Army did it brilliantly by setting up firebases in remote areas with helo lift of very heavy guns. A THAAD island deployment concept is the same in principle but with different technology.

Now combine these deployable ADA batteries with the ability to move a floating airfield as needed, the aircraft carrier carefully staying within 200-plus kilometers of the dispersed island bases so the land-based batteries can help protect it. As the US shapes such a defensive belt, Taiwan could be plugged. At some point in the future, as the island nation develops its own Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, Taiwan could operate its own air defense artillery and contribute to the firepower of the defensive grid.

The Taiwan Relations Act clearly permits such actions: “To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

President Trump has started the process of setting in motion a new policy. History may remember when Donald Trump took a phone call from President of Taiwan as a symbolic moment embodying the same moral imperative as Ronald Reagan’s demand in Berlin to “tear down this wall.”

 

[1] Laird, Robbin; Timperlake, Edward; Weitz, Richard (2013-10-28). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy: A 21st-Century Strategy (Praeger Security International) (pp. 25-26). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.

本報24/7隨時更新 歡迎定閱newsletter

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here